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GRINDING GEARS: MESHING MAINE




In Maine interesting and unresolved questions often arise when a
mortgagor files for bankruptcy after a judgment of foreclosure has
been entered in state court but before a foreclosure sale has oc-
curred. Specifically, what rights does the mortgagor have in the real
property? And are the mortgagee's subsequent steps to complete the
sale barred by the automatic stay of the Bankruptcy Code'
("Code")? These questions are made more difficult because Maine is
a title theory state2 and because the foreclosure sale occurs after the
expiration of the statutory redemption period rather than, as in
most states, before it.3 Because a mortgagor is statutorily entitled to
any surplus from a foreclosure sale,' this entitlement naturally pi-
ques the interest of a bankruptcy debtor, trustee, and judge. Each
may have a desire to assure that a surplus is created if at all possi-
ble. Each of these considerations reveals a tension between the Code
and Maine law. Unfortunately, even though the Maine bankruptcy
court has had the opportunity, it has failed thus far to clarify these
issues.5
This Article first discusses the Supreme Court case that should
control these issues, which held that a debtor's property rights in
bankruptcy are determined by state law. It then briefly outlines
Maine mortgage foreclosure law and the applicable provisions of the
Code. In order to enable courts to mesh the two fields of law without
* Associate, Norman, Hanson & DeTroy, Portland, Me. B.S., University of Maine,
1982; J.D., University of Maine School of Law, 1989.
1. The Bankruptcy Code is found within title II of the United States Code. The
automatic stay provision is found at 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988).
2. See Smith v. Varney, 309 A.2d 229, 232 (Me. 1973), cited in Martel v. Bearce,
311 A.2d 540, 543 (Me. 1973) ("[L]egal title was conveyed when he executed the
mortgage and his equitable title disappeared with the expiration of the period of re-
demption."). The Smith court noted that "the accepted doctrine in Maine is that a
mortgage is regarded as a conditional conveyance vesting the legal title in the mortga-
gee .... [A]ll that remain[s] in the [mortgagor] [is] the equity of redemption, i.e.,
the right to redeem the property by payment of the indebtedness .... This is
known as the equitable title." Smith v. Varney, 309 A.2d at 232 (citing First Auburn
Trust Co. v. Buck and Wellman, 16 A.2d 258, 137 Me. 172 (1940)).
3. See Mx. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6323 (West Supp. 1990-1991).
4. See id. §§ 6204-B, 6324 (West Supp. 1990-1991).
5. See, e.g., In re Tucker, 131 B.R. 245 (Bankr. D. Me. 1991); In re Raymond, No.
89-20430 (Bankr. D. Me. Feb. 21, 1990); In re F. Oliver Brittain, No. 89-10262
(Bankr. D. Me. Dec. 29, 1989).
MAINE LAW REVIEW
doing violence to either, this Article proposes a solution. First, it
asserts that the entry of a foreclosure judgment limits the scope of a
debtor's rights under the Code-an approach which comports with
legislative intent and Supreme Court mandate. Next, this Article
analyzes the extent to which the automatic stay applies to a mortga-
gee's efforts to conclude a foreclosure sale and suggests how courts
ought to analyze a mortgagee's request for relief from stay.
In addition, this Article explains the temptation of some courts to
make debtor-oriented decisions in certain cases where a surplus is
possible or reinstatement is desired. Such decisions are bad prece-
dent and run counter to existing law.' Finally, this Article contends
that the proposed analysis provides the Maine bankruptcy court
with an approach that will clarify the current confusing state of
bankruptcy law surrounding mortgagees' and mortgagors' rights in
bankruptcy while also harmonizing the Code and Maine law.
II. THE BUTNER DOCTRINE
The starting point for an analysis of this area of bankruptcy law is
the premise that a bankruptcy debtor's property rights are deter-
mined by state law. This is the clear position of the United States
Supreme Court.' Before one can ascertain a debtor/mortgagor's
rights in bankruptcy, one must first analyze applicable state law to
establish the parameters of existing rights. Only after such an analy-
sis can one ascertain what affect the filing of the bankruptcy peti-
tion will have on those rights and on the rights of the mortgagee.
In Butner v. United States,8 the Supreme Court rejected a federal
approach to property rights in bankruptcy. The Butner case in-
volved a dispute between a bankruptcy trustee and a second mort-
gagee over the right to rents collected from the debtor's mortgaged
property during the period between the mortgagor's bankruptcy and
the foreclosure sale. The Court rejected the mortgagee's argument
that his rights were "determined by a federal rule of equity" rather
than "by the law of the State where the property [was] located."9
In Butner .a debtor had filed for bankruptcy protection under
Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act, and the judge had approved a
6. The Maine bankruptcy court has succumbed to these temptations on at least
two occasions. In re F. Oliver Brittain allowed a debtor/mortgagor to retain property
in a Chapter 13 case after the redemption period expired because the mortgagee
failed to prove that no surplus was possible at a foreclosure sale. See infra notes 142-
48 and accompanying text. In re Tucker allowed a Chapter 13 debtor to retain prop-
erty after the entry of a foreclosure judgment but before the expiration of the re-
demption period so that the debtor could cure and reinstate the terms of the mort-
gage. See infra notes 149-53 and accompanying text.
7. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979).
8. Id. Butner was decided under the Bankruptcy Act rather than the Bankruptcy
Code.
9. Id. at 49.
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plan that made Butner a second mortgagee. Butner did not, how-
ever, receive any express security interest in the rents earned by the
mortgaged property. 10 The plan provided that an agent was to col-
lect the rents and apply them as directed by the court. The plan was
never confirmed, however, and the case was converted to a liquida-
tion case and a trustee appointed. The property securing Butner's
mortgage was sold, reducing the debt owed but leaving a deficiency.
Because the trustee had accumulated significant rents prior to the
sale, Butner claimed a security interest in those rents and sought to
have them applied to the balance of the second mortgage."
In determining the status of Butner's claim, the trial and appel-
late courts disagreed about both the effect and applicability of state
law. The district court recognized Butner's claim as secured on the
basis that state law entitled a mortgagee to rents after the mortga-
gor's default and upon change in possession. The district court in-
terpreted the appointment of a federal trustee as analogous to the
appointment of a receiver, which under state law satisfied the
change-in-possession requirement.' 2 The court of appeals reversed
upon a contrary interpretation of state law.'3 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari, however, to decide whether state law applied at
all. The argument that state law was inapplicable had prevailed at
the trial court as it had in a minority of circuits when courts in those
circuits had faced similar situations.
The Supreme Court addressed the "proper interpretation of the
federal statutes governing the administration of bankrupt estates.""
The Third and Seventh Circuits had adopted a federal rule of eq-
uity, reasoning that "since the bankruptcy court has the power to
deprive the mortgagee of his state-law remedy, equity requires that
the right to rents not be dependent on state-court action that may
be precluded by federal law."' 5 The Supreme Court rejected this
view, holding that "[p]roperty interests are created and defined by
state law.' 6 Moreover, "[t]he justifications for application of state
law are not limited to ownership interests; they apply with equal
force to security interests ...."I' In rejecting the Third and Sev-
enth Circuits' approach, the Court stated that "the federal bank-
ruptcy court should take whatever steps are necessary to ensure that
the mortgagee is afforded in federal bankruptcy court the same
10. Id. at 50.
11. Id. at 50-51.
12. Id. at 51.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 53.




protection he would have under state law if no bankruptcy had
ensued."'
In addition, the Court reasoned that the minority position would
at times give a mortgagee rights that it would not have had under
state law, and at other times would deprive the mortgagee of these
rights.19 The Court believed such treatment was inequitable and
summarized its position by stating that "[t]he essential point is that
in a properly administered scheme in which the basic federal rule is
that state law governs, the primary reason why any holder of a
mortgage may fail to collect rent immediately after default must
stem from state law. ' 20
The Butner decision clarified the role of state law in determining
property rights in bankruptcy. Under Butner, prior to deciding the
impact of federal bankruptcy law on property rights, a court must
first ascertain what the property rights are by analyzing state law.
III. MAINE MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE LAW
As we have seen, state foreclosure law determines the mortgagor's
and the mortgagee's property rights after a bankruptcy filing. In
Maine essentially three methods of foreclosing real estate mortgages
exist: strict foreclosure,21 power of sale foreclosure,22 and judicial
18. Id. at 56 (emphasis added).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 57 (emphases added).
21. Five variations on strict foreclosure are available by which a mortgagee can
commence foreclosure with little or no judicial process. Theoretically, protection for
the mortgagor is found in the one-year redemption period during which a mortgagor
can redeem the real estate by paying the outstanding balance of the mortgage, or can
commence its own judicial action to invoke any available defenses to the foreclosure
proceedings.
A mortgagee may institute strict foreclosure proceedings under a writ of possession
issued on a conditional judgment. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6201(1) (West 1980).
Specifically, the mortgagee can file a complaint claiming his right to possession; and if
the court finds that the mortgagee is entitled to possession, it will enter a conditional
judgment. This judgment will state that if the mortgagor pays the adjudged sum due
and payable within two months of the judgment, no writ of possession will issue and
the mortgage will be deemed void. Id. § 6252 (West 1980).
If the mortgagor consents in writing, the mortgagee can obtain possession of the
mortgaged premises without judicial process. Id. §§ 6252, 6201(2) (West 1980). Both
the mortgagee's affidavit, which should recite the fact and time of entry, and the
mortgagor's written consent must be recorded by the mortgagee within thirty days
after the entry is made. Id. § 6252.
In addition, a mortgagee can "enter peaceably and openly, if not opposed, in the
presence of 2 witnesses and take possession of the premises." Id. § 6201(3) (West
Supp. 1990-1991). Thereafter, the witnesses must sign and swear to a certificate that
recites the facts and time of entry, which certificate is then recorded in the registry of
deeds within thirty days after entry is made. Id.
Alternatively, a mortgagee may give public notice of the foreclosure in a newspaper
of general circulation in the county in which the real estate is located for three suc-
cessive weeks and then must record the notice in the registry of deeds within thirty
[Vol. 44:63
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foreclosure. Judicial foreclosure is the most prevalent method,23 and
this Article will focus on the mortgagee's options after receiving a
foreclosure judgment under the judicial foreclosure statute. The
other two methods are less frequently used.2 4
The Maine Legislature in 1975 authorized judicial foreclosures.25
Like other civil suits, a judicial foreclosure requires a summons and
complaint. The commencement of foreclosure proceedings termi-
nates a mortgagor's equity of redemption. After the entry of the
judgment of foreclosure, however, the mortgagor is allowed a statu-
tory redemption period of ninety days.26 Once the statutory redemp-
tion period has expired, the mortgagee must publish a notice of fore-
closure sale for three successive weeks, the first notice to be
published within ninety days of the expiration of the redemption
days of the last publication. Id. § 6203(1) (West Supp. 1990-1991).
Finally, a mortgagee can have an attested copy of the foreclosure notice served on
the mortgagor by a sheriff and then must record both the notice and the sheriff's
return in the registry of deeds within thirty days of the service. Id. § 6203(2) (West
1980).
22. A mortgagee of real estate of a corporation having a mortgage containing a
power of sale may execute the power of sale as provided by the mortgage document,
subject to some minimum statutory requirements. Id. § 6203-A (West Supp. 1990-
1991). Maine law does not explicitly prohibit a power of sale foreclosure of a
noncorporate mortgage but instead renders any such mortgage term ineffectual by
force of statute. Specifically, Maine law allows the mortgagee and mortgagor to agree
to any period of redemption that is not less than one year. Id. § 6204 (West 1980).
The mortgagee must publish a notice of sale for three successive weeks in a newspa-
per of general circulation in the county in which the real estate is located. A copy of
this notice must be served on the mortgagor at least twenty-one days prior to the
date of sale. Id. § 6203-A.
Moreover, the deed from the sale must convey the premises subject to all restric-
tions, easements, encumbrances and the like that were of record prior to thb mort-
gage. No statutory redemption period exists for this type of foreclosure. Id. §§ 6202,
6204 (West 1980).
23. See Kathleen Barry, Comment, The Constitutionality of Maine's Real Estate
Mortgage Foreclosure Statutes, 32 M. L. Rav. 147, 148 (1980) ('[L~enders in
Maine's largest city have recently abandoned all methods of foreclosure except fore-
closure by civil action."). For corporate mortgages, however, mortgagees most fre-
quently employ the power of sale provisions contained in their mortgages. See id. at
152.
24. Arguably, Maine's strict foreclosure statutes may fail to give mortgagors ade-
quate notice or a sufficient right to be heard prior to depriving them of their property
interests. See Kathleen Barry, Comment, The Constitutionality of Maine's Real Es-
tate Mortgage Foreclosure Statutes, 32 Ma L Rav. 147 (1980). Power of sale foreclo-
sure is possible only if the mortgagor is a corporation. M. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14,
§ 6203-A (West Supp. 1990-1991).
25. P.L. 1975, ch. 522 (effective Oct. 1, 1975). This bill was entitled "An Act In-
suring Due Process of Law to Consumers in the Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgages
and to Require Accounting for Surplus Therefrom." The Legislature feared that the
strict foreclosure statutes would not pass constitutional muster under Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). See L.D. 1283, Statement of Fact (107th Legis. 1975).
26. See Ma. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6322 (West Supp. 1990-1991).
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period. In addition, once the property is sold, the mortgagee must
account to the mortgagor for any surplus proceeds generated.
27
Upon the expiration of the statutory redemption period, the mort-
gagor's interest in the property is completely extinguished.2 8 This is
a consequence of Maine's adherence to the title theory, under which
the mortgagee holds legal title and the mortgagor holds equitable
title. At the expiration of the statutory period of redemption, how-
ever, the mortgagor's equitable title is completely extinguished,
merging with the mortgagee's legal title. Thus, at that point the
mortgagee holds all the attributes of complete title but is subject to
a statutory obligation to sell and to account for any surplus sale
proceeds.9
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, has
held that a mortgagor's rights after a foreclosure sale are more akin
to a chose in action than a property right. In Martel v. Bearce3" a
defendant had executed on a judgment, forcing a sheriff's sale of
real estate that had been levied upon. Title to the real estate, how-
ever, had passed to a municipality prior to its being levied upon and
sold, causing the purchaser at the sheriff's sale to sue the defendant
for return of the purchase price. The defendant argued that despite
the title having passed to the municipality, the sheriff had levied
upon an attachable interest in the real estate-the judgment
debtor's right to challenge that title2 The court noted, however,
that the interest of the judgment debtor had been extinguished
upon the expiration of the redemption period, stating that the "for-
mer owner's right of redemption-and, in fact, his title-are extin-
guished. As in the case of the common law mortgagor, there remains
only the contingency that he may be able . . . to demonstrate in a
legal action a failure in the procedure by which his title was lost." 3
Moreover, the Law Court held that although a right to redeem is a
right and interest in real property and attachable, this contingent
right is not. The court stated that this right "is more a chose in
action than an interest in land and no provision was made for the
levy and sale of such contingent rights by [statute]." 33
This Article contends that a mortgagor's right to surplus proceeds
from a foreclosure sale is analogous to the judgment debtor's right
to challenge the title. Both are merely contingent and therefore
neither is a right in the property. It is with this understanding of
Maine law that one must begin the inquiry into the mortgagor's and
27. Id. § 6324 (West Supp. 1990-1991).
28. Martel v. Bearce, 311 A.2d 540, 543 (Me. 1973).
29. See Smith v. Varney, 309 A.2d 229, 232 (Me. 1973).
30. 311 A.2d 540.
31. Id. at 543-44.
32. Id. at 543.
33. Id. at 544.
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mortgagee's rights in bankruptcy.
IV. MESHING THE BANKRUPTCY CODE WITH MAINE MORTGAGE
FORECLOSURE PROPERTY LAW
When a mortgagor files for bankruptcy protection after the entry
of a foreclosure judgment, the analysis of the parameters of the
mortgagor's rights in bankruptcy will vary depending under which
chapter of the Code the mortgagor files for protection. In a Chapter
7 liquidation case, the mortgagor may attempt to persuade a court
to allow it to sell the property in order to generate a surplus,
thereby creating a concomitant benefit to the estate. Although this
may also be true in Chapters 11 and 13, the issue in those chapters
usually involves the debtor's right to cure and reinstate the mort-
gage terms.
A. Chapter 7 Liquidation
Upon the filing of a Chapter 734 petition, an automatic stay pre-
vents certain actions by creditors against the debtor, the debtor's
property, and property of the estate. 5 A mortgagee thereupon faces
the questions whether and to what extent its actions are barred by
the automatic stay. Assume that the debtor/mortgagor is in default
under the note and mortgage and the note has been accelerated.3 0
The stay clearly applies when the mortgagee has not obtained a
foreclosure judgment prior to the filing of the petition; it prevents
the continuation or commencement of any action to procure such a
judgment.3 ' If, however, the mortgagee has obtained a foreclosure
judgment, but either the redemption period has not yet expired or
the foreclosure sale has not yet occurred, whether the mortgagor is
protected by the stay is less clear.
It is clear, however, that the stay will not prevent the redemption
period from running. The Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Maine has held that the automatic stay, while applicable, does not
34. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-728 (1988).
35. Id. § 362(a) (1988). See infra note 39.
36. A standard mortgage contains a clause that allows the holder, upon the mort-
gagor's default, to demand immediate payment of the accelerated outstanding princi-
pal plus accrued interest. In Maine, without such an acceleration clause, only the
arrearage can be demanded by the mortgagee. See Hills v. Gardiner Say. Inst.. 309
A.2d 877 (Me. 1973).
37. See, e.g., In re Gaskin, 120 B.R. 13, 16 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1990) ("[W]hen a bank-
ruptcy petition is filed, an automatic stay prevents any creditor from attempting to
foreclose on the debtor."); In re Spencer, 115 B.R. 471, 483 (Bankr. D. Del. 1990)
(holding that debtor's legal title to property is protected by automatic stay); In re
Littke, 105 B.R. 905, 909 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989) ("By initiating its foreclosure ac-




toll the running of the redemption period.3 8 According to that court,
the automatic stay prohibits an entity from doing acts that it other-
wise is entitled to do, but the stay "does not stay the running of any
time period.'3 9
The redemption period, however, can be extended beyond the
ninety-day state statutory period by application of section 108 of
the Code."' That section provides that if a particular time period
has not expired prior to the filing of a bankruptcy petition (e.g., a
redemption period), the time period will run until the later of the
original time period or sixty days from the petition date.41 Once the
redemption period has expired, however, the right of redemption is
lost forever.4
2
As noted, the filing of the Chapter 7 petition does not toll the
running of the redemption period. Therefore, the debtor's protection
from the creditor-mortgagee depends upon whether the creditor's
future actions would affect interests in the property that remain in
either the bankruptcy estate or the debtor and on the nature of
those retained interests. Under Butner the nature and extent of the
debtor's interest in specific property are determined by state law.43
In addition, property of the bankruptcy estate is derived from the
debtor's rights,4 4 and it is well settled that the "Bankruptcy Code
does not create or enhance property rights of a debtor.' 4 Therefore,
upon entry of the foreclosure judgment and the expiration of the
statutory redemption period, the estate is left with only those rights
38. In re Thom, Inc., 95 B.R. 261, 264 (Bankr. D. Me. 1989).
39. Id. at 263 (emphasis added). Specifically, the Thom court stated:
The effect of § 362 is to stay an entity from doing that which such entity
has the power to do. An entity may be stayed from enforcing a judgment,
from exercising control over property of the estate or property in possession
of the estate, from enforcing liens on property of the estate, from acts to
create, perfect or enforce against property of the debtor any lien to the
extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the commencement
of the case.
Id. The Thom holding regarding the effect of the automatic stay is in accord with the
majority of courts. See In re Farmer, 81 B.R. 857, 859 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (citing
long list of cases in accord with Thorn, which "clearly constitute the majority posi-
tion."). But see In re Jenkins, 19 B.R. 105 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1982), overruled by In re
Cucumber Creek Dev., Inc., 33 B.R. 820 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983); In re Sapphire Inv.,
19 B.R. 492 (Bankr. D. Ark. 1982); In re Shea Realty, Inc., 21 B.R. 790 (Bankr. D. Vt.
1982).
40. 11 U.S.C. § 108(b)(1)-(2) (1988). See In re Tucker, 131 B.R. 245, 245 (Bankr.
D. Me. 1991); In re Thom, Inc., 95 B.R. at 263.
41. See 11 U.S.C. § 108(b)(1)-(2) (1988).
42. See, e.g., St. Hilaire v. Berta, 588 A.2d 309, 310 (Me. 1991); Smith v. Varney,
309 A.2d 229, 232 (Me. 1973).
43. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979); In re Kwaak, 42 B.R. 599,
601 (Bankr. D. Me. 1984).
44. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 541, 1306 (1988).
45. In re Gull Air, Inc., 890 F.2d 1255, 1261 (1st Cir. 1989).
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that the debtor would have had. Furthermore, recall that Maine law
holds that the mortgagor's interest in the property is completely ex-
tinguished upon expiration of the statutory period of redemption.' 0
The consequences of the mortgagee's impending sale often create
a tension between the practical interests of the estate and the mort-
gagee. Under the judicial foreclosure statute, the mortgagor is enti-
tled to any surplus from the foreclosure sale. Of course if there is no
equity in the property, the trustee will not care about the sale. On
the other hand, if it appears that a sale may generate significant
estate funds beyond encumbrances and allowable exemptions,' 7 the
trustee will be interested in the proceeds. Indeed, the trustee may
believe that the estate can sell the property at a better price and at
less cost than a mortgagee-and thus create a larger surplus. Usu-
ally the mortgagee will be uninterested in maximizing the surplus
but will instead be content with a relatively quick sale that covers
costs and the outstanding balance, or at least with a sale at a price
sufficient to reduce its deficiency to an acceptable level. These con-
flicting interests often place the mortgagee and the Chapter 7 trus-
tee in conflict.
This practical conflict must be resolved by the bankruptcy judge's
examination of the applicability of the automatic stay to the im-
pending sale. Therefore, the issue posed is whether the trustee or
debtor has any rights in the property sufficient to justify permitting
either one to retain or dispose of the property.'8
Clearly, the trustee can redeem up to the later of the expiration of
the original statutory redemption period or sixty days after the date
of the filing of the petition.9 Presumably, the trustee would not
have the right to sell the property without redeeming first. Prior to
the expiration of the redemption period, only the equity of redemp-
tion is the property of the estate. This property interest engenders
certain limited rights, e.g., the right to redeem.10 A mortgagee is pro-
hibited by the automatic stay from continuing any legal action
against property of the estate.
46. See St. Hilaire v, Berta, 588 A.2d at 310.
47. The exemption provisions are found in section 522 of the Code. 11 U.S.C.
§ 522 (1988). Maine, however, has opted out of the federal scheme, effectively limit-
ing a debtor to exemptions under Maine law. See id. § 522(b)(I); Mn- Rav. STAT. ANN-
tit. 14, §§ 4421-4426 (West Supp. 1990-1991).
48. Of course, if no equity exists in the property, most likely neither will care if
the mortgagee sells the property.
49. See In re Tucker, 131 B.&. 245, 245 (Bankr. D. Me. 1991); In re Thom, Inc.,
95 B.R. 261 (Bankr. D. Me. 1989); 11 U.S.C. § 108(b) (1988).
50. In addition to the right to redeem, a debtor/mortgagor may be entitled to
other rights, such as the right to possession until the right of redemption is fore-
closed. These rights are delineated by state law. See supra notes 21-33 and accompa-
nying text. Moreover, whatever these rights of the debtor are, the bankruptcy estate
obtains those same rights but does not enjoy the right to expand upon them. See
supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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Upon expiration of the redemption period, however, the stay
should prevent the foreclosure sale only if there are property inter-
ests in the estate affected by the sale. Recall, however, that at this
point the right of redemption has been lost forever, 1 and the estate
no longer has any interest in the property. The estate retains only
the right to receive the proceeds of any surplus from the foreclosure
sale. This property interest, however, should be distinguished from
an interest in the property.2 Although the estate or debtor has a
statutory right to any surplus, this is not a right in the property
itself. The right is strictly statutory in origin and confers no right
upon a mortgagor in the real property. The statute merely imposes
upon the mortgagee the duty to account to the mortgagor for any
surplus.
This analysis is supported by the fact that prior to 1975 strict
foreclosure was the only method available to a mortgagee. 3 Histori-
cally, upon the expiration of the redemption period under strict
foreclosure, which, as noted above, is one year, the mortgagor's
rights in the property were completely extinguished. The mortgagee
could then do whatever it pleased with the property, including sell-
ing it, and did not have to account to the debtor for any surplus sale
proceeds.' Only upon passage of the judicial foreclosure statute did
a mortgagor gain the right to any surplus.8 5 With respect to a mort-
gagor's interest in the property itself, however, the statute left the
51. Smith v. Varney, 309 A.2d 229, 232 (Me. 1973) ("This right of redemption,
once extinguished, cannot be revived by any court, nor can the period of redemption
be abridged or enlarged by operation of law.").
52. See In re Raymond, No. 89-20430, slip op. at 6 (Bankr. D. Me. Feb. 21, 1990)
("The plain meaning of the language of the [foreclosure] statute indicates that where
the mortgagor/Debtors have not redeemed the mortgage within the period of redemp-
tion, all of the Debtors' rights to the specific property have expired."). See also In re
Brown, 126 B.R. 767 (N.D. Ill. 1991). The Brown court analyzed IRS levy and sale
provisions, noting that an IRS sale is the point at which a debtor's interest is termi-
nated, and stated that "[a]fter this point, the debtor may no longer redeem the prop-
erty by paying off the tax assessment and, although the debtor may still retain an
interest in the excess sale proceeds, he retains no interest in the property itself." Id.
at 766 (emphasis added). See also In re Roach, 824 F.2d 1370 (3d Cir. 1987). The
Roach court concluded
[T]hat the right of cure terminates in New Jersey upon the entry of a fore-
closure judgment is informed not only by our analysis of the text of
§ 1322(b) and its legislative history, but also by our understanding of the
relationship between federal bankruptcy law and the state law context in
which it operates.
Id. at 1373 (emphasis added).
53. See P.L. 1975, ch. 552 § 5. See also Barry, supra note 23 at 147-48.
54. See Atlantic Oceanic Kampgrounds, Inc. v. Camden Nat'l Bank, 473 A.2d 884
(Me. 1984); P.L. 1975 ch. 552, § 4; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6204-B (West Supp.
1990-1991).
55. See P.L. 1975, ch. 552, § 5.
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law unchanged. 6 Clearly, the benefit conferred upon the mortgagor
by the statute is separate and distinct from the interest in the prop-
erty that the mortgagor previously retained. In essence, the statute
left the property law unchanged and merely conferred upon the
mortgagor a previously nonexistent right to proceeds.
B. Chapter 13 Debt Adjustment
1. Cure
The Chapter 13 7 debtor is different from the Chapter 7 debtor in
that the Chapter 13 debtor ordinarily has nonexempt assets that he
is seeking to protect."' Often the most important asset that a debtor
hopes to retain is his residence.59 A Chapter 13 debtor may have
struggled vainly with a mortgagee to cure arrearages but simply
been unable to do so in light of income limitations and other credi-
tors' demands. Once a mortgagee institutes foreclosure proceedings,
a mortgagor may decide to seek protection under the Code by filing
a petition for relief under Chapter 13. The filing invokes the auto-
matic stay, which puts the foreclosure action on hold. Section 1322
authorizes a plan that allows the debtor to cure the mortgage arrear-
ages and effectively de-accelerate the note and resume regular pay-
ments as scheduled."
56. Compare Martel v. Bearce, 311 A.2d 540, 543 (Me. 1973) with StL Hilaire v.
Berta, 588 A.2d 309, 310 (Me. 1991).
57. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (1988). Chapter 13 is entitled "Adjustment of Debts of
an Individual with Regular Income." As contrasted with a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case
wherein the debtor essentially surrenders all nonexempt property for liquidation, a
Chapter 13 case is designed to allow a debtor to retain his existing assets while still
providing protection to creditors. See H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 118
(1977); In re Breuer, 4 B.R. 499, 501-02 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980). As one commentator
has stated:
Chapter 13 was designed to allow an individual to devise and perform a
plan to repay his debts over an extended period under the supervision and
protection of the court. This chapter places a larger emphasis on favoring
the consumer-debtor as against the creditor in order to improve and en-
hance the ability of the debtor to reorganize.
Ann B. Miller, Comment, Chapter 13 Bankruptcy: When May A Mortgage Debtor
Cure the Accelerated Mortgage Debt Using Section 1322(b)(5)? 8 U. D-roN L REv.
109, 112 (1982) (footnote omitted).
58. Id. at 115.
59. See James S. Sable, A Chapter 13 Debtor's Right to Cure Default Under Sec-
tion 1322(b): A Problem of Interpretation, 57 ALL BANK. L.J. 127 (1983); Barry L
Zaretsky, Some Limits on Mortgagees' Rights in Chapter 13, 50 BRooK. L Rav. 433
(1984).
60. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2), (5) (1988). See also 5 CoLwIER ON BANKRuW'CY,
§ 1322 (L. King ed., 15th ed. Matthew Bender 1990). One commentator described a
typical scenario regarding default, acceleration, and cure, stating,
When a homeowner falls behind in her mortgage payments and the mort-
gagee declares a default, foreclosure proceedings typically begin with the
mortgagee accelerating the loan. Once accelerated, the entire amount of the
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If, however, for whatever reason, the mortgagor has waited until
after the mortgagee has obtained a foreclosure judgment, then the
issue becomes more complicated. As stated previously, the period of
redemption in Maine is ninety days from the entry of the foreclo-
sure judgment, and the automatic stay does not toll the running of
this time period. 1 Only section 108 potentially affects the length of
the redemption period by allowing the trustee to redeem within the
later of the original ninety days or sixty days from the date of filing
of the petition.62
In most cases the debtor will want to cure arrearages and de-ac-
celerate the note under Section 1322 just like any Chapter 13 debtor
who filed a petition prior to the entry of a foreclosure judgment. If
the mortgagee balks at such a request, however, the debtor presuma-
bly is powerless to compel such an arrangement because at this
point the bankruptcy estate retains only the right to redeem the
property by payment of the full debt rather than the right to pay
the debt over time.6 3 It is with this understanding of Maine law that
one must begin the inquiry into the mortgagor's and mortgagee's
rights in bankruptcy.
Analysis of the debtor's ability to cure postfiling begins by looking
at what his rights would have been had he not filed for bankruptcy.
Various jurisdictions view a debtor's right to cure and de-accelerate
a note and mortgage pursuant to section 1322 of the Code differ-
ently." Some jurisdictions hold that a Chapter 13 debtor can cure
only prior to de-acceleration 65 Others allow the Chapter 13 debtor
to cure at any time prior to entry of a foreclosure judgment," while
still others provide that cure can be accomplished at any time prior
to the foreclosure sale.6 7
mortgage loan, not just the arrearage owed, is due and payable immedi-
ately. To save the home from the foreclosure selling block, the homeowner
must meet the virtually insurmountable task of paying off the entire loan.
Homeowners facing this predicament often look to Chapter 13 of the fed-
eral Bankruptcy Code for assistance. The Code affords debtors the right to
cure the default-pay off the arrearage-and thereby de-accelerate the
mortgage and reinstate the original payment schedule.
Douglas A. Winthrop, Note, The Chapter 13 Cure Provisions: A Doctrine in Need of
a Cure, 74 MINN. L. REV. 921, 921 (1990) (footnotes omitted).
61. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
62. See 11 U.S.C. § 108(b) (1988); In re Thom, 95 B.R. 261 (Bankr. D. Me. 1989).
See also supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
63. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text. See also In re Johnson, 719
F.2d 270, 276 (8th Cir. 1983).
64. See In re Ivory, 32 B.R. 788, 790 (Bankr. D. Or. 1983) (citing cases in jurisdic-
tions with various viewpoints). See also Sable, supra note 59, at 128-29.
65. In re Allen, 17 B.R. 119 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981); In re Lapaglia, 8 B.R. 937,
944 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981); In re Wilson, 11 B.R. 986, 990 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981).
66. See, e.g., In re Maiorino, 15 B.R. 254, 257-58 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981); In re
Pearson, 10 B.R. 189, 193 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981).
67. See, e.g., In re Tucker, 131 B.R. 245 (Bankr. D. Me. 1991); In re Acevedo, 26
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2. Prejudgment De-acceleration and Cure
Prior to a judgment of foreclosure, it makes inherent sense that a
debtor could cure mortgage arrearages and effectively de-accelerate
the mortgagee's prior acceleration and reinstate the note and mort-
gage. Because of the prevalence of automatic acceleration clauses,
almost every Chapter 13 debtor who is in default under his mort-
gage and note holds a note that has already been accelerated by the
time his bankruptcy petition is filed. Thus, if the debtor could not
cure under such a scenario (i.e., after the filing of the petition but
before entry of a foreclosure judgment), the cure provision in section
1322 would be virtually meaningless. 68
3. Postjudgment De-acceleration and Cure
At the other extreme are those jurisdictions that give a debtor an
almost unfettered right to cure, including cure postjudgment and up
to any point prior to a foreclosure sale.60 Courts in these jurisdic-
tions hold that since section 1322 provides for the curing of defaults,
federal law controls and allows cure despite state law that may pro-
vide only for redemption of the property. This is a curious approach
because it requires courts to look initially to state law to ascertain
the debtor's interest in the property, as mandated by Butner, but
then to declare that state law is irrelevant when analyzing the cure
provisions. If indeed rights in property are defined by state law,
state law should continue to be relevant when analyzing the debtor's
right to cure. Rather than simply ascertain whether the debtor has
any rights at all in the property (rights that are then used to justify
unfettered curing authority), these jurisdictions should first deter-
mine the nature of the property interest at issue and then determine
cure rights in accordance with that interest.
Certain courts, however, have indicated that determining what
type of interest the debtor has in the property is irrelevant to the
issue of cure. These courts take the position that curing a default
addresses a contractual relationship between the creditor and
debtor."0 Thus, as long as the debtor has some interest remaining in
the property at the time of the filing of the petition, the Code pro-
vides for the curing of the default under the contract. Such a cure is
allowable even after a judgment because a judgment "merely con-
B.R. 994, 997 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982); In re James, 20 B.R. 145, 149 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. 1982).
68. See, e.g., In re Roach, 824 F.2d 1370, 1377 (3d Cir. 1987); In re Taddeo, 685
F.2d 24, 29 (2d. Cir. 1981).
69. See, e.g., In re Taddeo, 685 F.2d at 29; In re Tucker 131 B.1. at 246 (Bankr.
D. Me. 1991); In re Johnson, 29 B.R. 104, 105 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1983); In re Acevedo,
26 B.R. at 997.
70. See, e.g., In re Taddeo, 685 F.2d at 26; In re Ivory, 32 B.R. 788 (Bankr. D. Or.
1983); In re Thompson, 17 B.R. 748, 751 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1982).
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firms what the parties already knew[,]" 7' namely, that the entire
amount of the debt was due and owing. Thus, these courts view a
prejudgment acceleration under the note and mortgage as being no
different from a foreclosure judgment itself; federal law trumps
both.
Moreover, a common theme in these jurisdictions is that the
broadest cure rights reflect the policy underlying the cure provisions
and best foster the "fresh start" concept.
72
4. The Limits to Curing Pursuant to Section 1322(b)
The task of reconciling the Code provisions with state law should
have been made much easier by the Supreme Court's seminal deci-
sion in Butner v. United States.73 The Butner court rejected any
notion of a uniform federal approach to property rights in bank-
ruptcy, instead decreeing a uniform approach to property rights in
both federal and state courts within a particular state.7 4 Thus, al-
though the Code provides the structure for determining what consti-
tutes property of the estate, state law governs the nature and extent
of a debtor's interest in specific property. To that end the Butner
court pointedly stated that "the federal bankruptcy court should
take whatever steps are necessary to ensure that the mortgagee is
afforded in federal bankruptcy court the same protection he would
have under state law if no bankruptcy had ensued."'7 Moreover,
the Court stated that such an approach would prevent a debtor from
receiving "a windfall merely by reason of the happenstance of
bankruptcy. '7 6
Therefore, the better reasoned cases conclude that a debtor has no
right to cure mortgage defaults once a judgment of foreclosure has
been entered. This approach best interprets the language of the
Code and dovetails with the Butner doctrine.
This view was ably articulated in In re Roach.7 The Roach court
concluded that the common meaning of curing a 'default refers to a
contractual relationship. Once a judgment of foreclosure is entered,
the contractual relationship is erased and the creditor's note is re-
placed by a judgment, which confers certain rights different from
those arising under a note.78 As noted above some courts argue that
a foreclosure judgment is no different in kind from a prejudgment
71. Zaretsky, supra note 59 at 447. See also Winthrop, supra note 60, at 946; In
re Clark, 738 F.2d 869, 874 (7th Cir. 1984).
72. See, e.g., In re Taddeo, 685 F.2d at 29 (2d Cir. 1982); In re Tucker, 131 B.R.
at 246; In re Ivory, 32 B.R. at 792.
73. 440 U.S. 48 (1979).
74. Id. at 55.
75. Id. at 56 (emphasis added).
76. Id. at 55 (citation omitted).
77. 824 F.2d 1370 (3d Cir. 1987).
78. Id. at 1377-78.
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acceleration under the terms of the note because such a judgment
"merely confirms what the parties already knew." It may be true
that judgments often merely confirm "what the parties already
knew," but that does not mean that judgments are any less signifi-
cant or should be cast aside so easily.
Although the Code does not call for casting aside state judgments,
this point has been missed by some courts. In In re Ivory,7 0 for ex-
ample, the court stated that the Code is replete with examples of
such voiding. The Ivory court, however, misconstrued the nature of
the statutory provisions it used to support its position. Each of the
Code provisions cited by the Ivory court provides for the voiding of
judicial liens under certain circumstances but in no way voids the
underlying judgments."' These courts fail to explain adequately why
a state court judgment ought to be voided. Notwithstanding the
Ivory decision, the Code contains no support for such an approach. 1
If bankruptcy courts adopted the view that state court judgments
could be voided, other judgments would also be susceptible to void-
ance. The following example illustrates the Code's reluctance to void
judgments. Suppose Mr. Brown is a widget reseller who purchases
widgets from Alpha Company. Alpha, impressed by Brown's sales
record, agrees to send him $60,000 worth of widgets to allow him to
expand his business. In addition, Alpha agrees to finance the $60,000
over twenty years at 10%. Thus, Brown must pay Alpha $579 per
month for twenty years.
Unfortunately, Brown is subsequently injured in a fall and cannot
sell widgets until he completes his physical rehabilitation. As a re-
sult he falls six months behind on his payments to Alpha. Alpha
accelerates the note and sues Brown, obtaining a judgment. After
judgment, but before Alpha can execute on it, Brown files for pro-
tection under Chapter 13. He has fallen behind on his home mort-
gage payments as well and wishes to avoid foreclosure.
Because he has equity in two significant assets, Brown must fund
a so-called 100% plan. 2 Unfortunately, due to a downturn in the
demand for widgets, Brown cannot generate enough income to fund
a 100% plan. He realizes, however, that if he takes the $60,000 judg-
ment of Alpha Company out of the general unsecured pool and pays
it off under the terms of the original note at $579 per month, he can
spread that $60,000 over twenty years rather than over the life of
79. 32 B.R. 788 (Bankr. D. Or. 1983).
80. Id. at 792. The court cited II U.S.C. § 522(f) and § 547(b).
81. See In re McKinney, 84 B.R. 748 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1987). The MeKinney court
was construing the analogous Chapter 12 provision regarding cure and reinstatement.
Id. at 751 (citing § 1222(b)(5)). The McKinney court explicitly stated that the section
was "not so powerful a remedy that it can set aside a state court judgment." Id.
(citing In re Roach, 824 F.2d 1370 (3d Cir. 1987); In re Maiorino, 15 B.R. 254 (Bankr.
D. Conn. 1981); In re Davis, 16 B.R. 473, 475 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981)).
82. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4)-(5) (1988).
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the plan. Most important, he could then fund a 100% plan.
Thus, Brown proposes to cure his default under the Alpha note by
voiding the state court judgment and reinstating the terms of the
note. In addition, he proposes to cure the arrearage through the
trustee while maintaining regular payments as called for by the note
directly to the creditor.
Although the above scenario may be desirable to a debtor, it is not
provided for in the Code. Moreover, one can imagine the potential
havoc that such an interpretation of "curing defaults" would wreak.
The voidance of state court judgments is bad policy and one not
embodied in the Code.
8 3
Furthermore, the basis of the creditor's claim in the bankruptcy
case derives from a judgment, not a contractual relationship. Al-
though the contractual relationship gave rise to the judgment, it
nonetheless was effectively terminated by the entry of judgment. 4
Employing this distinction, the Roach court held that the commonly
understood meaning of the words "cure" and "default" in the con-
text of section 1322 leads to the conclusion that Congress meant to
authorize the curing of a default of a contractual relationship28
Moreover, the Roach court noted that New Jersey law holds that the
mortgage is merged into the foreclosure judgment-and thus noth-
ing remains to be cured. More important, the court stated that
"even if a mortgage were not extinguished when a judgment is en-
tered, a final state court foreclosure judgment in New Jersey estab-
lishes rights in the property distinct from those conferred by the
mortgage.""8
This point is crucial in analyzing the scope of Chapter 13 cure
provisions. The Supreme Court in Butner stated that property in-
83. The Roach court stated that "[t]he legislative history of the cure provisions of
§ 1322(b)(3) and § 1322(b)(5), like their text, is also devoid of any suggestion that
Congress intended to give home mortgage debtors the right to set aside or suspend
state court judgments." In re Roach, 824 F.2d at 1378. As a further rationale for its
position, the Roach court stated:
If Congress had intended to grant such authority, we think its sensitivity to
considerations of comity would have resulted in some explanation of the
necessity for the intrusion on state sovereignty. In the absence of any such
explanation, we can only conclude that Congress did not see cures of mort-
gage defaults as any threat to the integrity of state judgments.
Nor can we perceive any reason why Congress might have felt it neces-
sary or desirable to authorize the extinguishment or suspension of state
judgments. Termination of the right of cure at the time of the entry of
judgment, unlike termination upon contractual acceleration, does not sig-
nificantly threaten the interests that Chapter 13 was designed to protect.
Id. See also In re McKinney, 84 B.R. at 751 (stating that an analogous Chapter 12
provision is "not so powerful a remedy that it can set aside a state court judgment.").
84. See North Bank v. Brown, 50 Me. 214, 216 (1861); Uran v. Houdlette, 36 Me.
15, 16 (1853); Pike v. McDonald, 32 Me. 418 (1851).
85. In re Roach, 842 F.2d at 1377.
86. Id. at 1377-78 (emphasis added).
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terests are delineated by state law.8 7 If section 1322 allows a cure
after a judgment of foreclosure has been entered, the nature of the
property rights is effectively altered. The Butner doctrine is thus
rendered meaningless in Chapter 13 cases. If a court analyzes a
debtor's property rights under state law and concludes that he re-
tains only a statutory right to redeem, but then adds that he can
nonetheless cure and de-accelerate under section 1322, the court is
effectively concluding that the debtor actually has more rights in the
property than merely a statutory right to redeem. Thus, the Butner
doctrine is effectively circumvented.
The above approach should not result in a debtor being unable to
cure even after an automatic acceleration but before a foreclosure
judgment on the basis that state law may provide that a debtor has
only the right to redeem, not cure. An important difference distin-
guishes the two situations. State law may not provide for cure, but
federal law controls with regard to curing in Chapter 13. This is the
truncated analysis .used by courts adopting the "unfettered-curing-
authority" approach. It is state law respecting property rights, how-
ever, that helps to determine the parameters of the federal law of
curing, not state cure law. The Roach court succinctly summarized
this analysis:
Although we agree that federal law controls the scope of §
1322(b)'s authorization to cure defaults, we do not believe that
state law is irrelevant. As we have noted, the Supreme Court has
indicated that, in bankruptcy, absent a federal interest requiring a
different result, "[piroperty interests are created and defined by
state law" and "[u]niform treatment of property interests by both
state and federal courts within a State serves to reduce uncer-
tainty, to discourage forum shopping, and to prevent a party from
receiving a windfall merely by reason of the happenstance of
bankruptcy.""
Furthermore, in the Maine bankruptcy court, the argument that
the debtor's right to cure terminates upon the entry of a foreclosure
judgment is even more compelling than in other jurisdictions be-
cause Maine's approach to judicial foreclosure provides for a statu-
tory redemption period commencing immediately upon the entry of
the foreclosure judgment and prior to any sale."9 In contrast, most
other jurisdictions that provide statutory redemption periods re-
quire a sale subsequent to the foreclosure judgment. In those juris-
dictions the sale commences the redemption period. Most impor-
tant, upon the expiration of the statutory redemption period in
87. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979).
88. In re Roach, 824 F.2d at 1379 (emphasis added) (quoting Butner v. United
States, 440 U.S. at 55).
89. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6323 (West Supp. 1990-1991).
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Maine, the debtor/mortgagor's rights in the property are completely
extinguished."
In addition, if a mortgagor files a Chapter 13 petition after the
entry of a foreclosure judgment, the automatic stay does not toll the
running of the redemption period.91 Once the period expires, the
debtor has no interest in the property. Therefore, allowing the
debtor to cure postjudgment would be incongruous with Maine
property law. Specifically, allowing postjudgment cure would in es-
sence toll the running of the period of redemption. This must be the
case; otherwise, the debtor would have no interest in the property
upon the expiration of the redemption period, and the curing of the
note default would not revest the debtor with an interest in the
property. Therefore, allowing the Chapter 13 debtor to cure
postjudgment means allowing the automatic stay to toll the running
of the redemption period-despite prior holdings of the Maine
bankruptcy court to the contrary.2
Assuming that the Maine bankruptcy court is correct in its prior
holdings that the running of the redemption period is not tolled by
the automatic stay, the conclusion that the entry of a foreclosure
judgment terminates the debtor's right to cure makes sense in light
of both the statutory language of the Code and Maine law. Specifi-
cally, upon entry of the foreclosure judgment, the note is merged
into the judgment and the nature of the relationship between the
debtor and the creditor is altered. The judgment gives a creditor
rights different from those under the note, and the concept of curing
defaults is inapplicable to judgments. Moreover, the inexorable
march to termination of rights in the property continues despite the
filing of the petition. Thus, once the period of redemption expires,
the debtor has no interest remaining in the property.
Such an analysis is also in accord with Butner. Were the debtor
able to cure and de-accelerate the note and mortgage, the Butner
analysis would be rendered nugatory because a debtor would effec-
tively have greater rights than he would have had under state law.
These greater rights would not only be greater cure rights, which
could be justified because federal cure law applies rather than state
cure law, but would also be greater property rights. This could not
be justified in light of Butner. Thus, the type of property interest
remaining in the debtor at the time of the bankruptcy petition must
necessarily guide a bankruptcy court in analyzing the parameters of
the cure provisions. In Maine, once a foreclosure judgment is en-
90. See St. Hilaire v. Berta, 588 A.2d 309, 310 (Me. 1991); Smith v. Varney, 309
A.2d 229, 232 (Me. 1973).
91. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
92. See e.g., In re Tucker, 131 B.R. 245 (Bankr. D. Me. 1991); In re Thorn, Inc.,
95 B.R. 261 (Bankr. D. Me. 1989).
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tered, a debtor's only right is the right to redeem. 3 Upon expiration
of the statutory redemption period, the debtor has no rights left in
the property. Thus, a Maine Chapter 13 debtor can only "cure" a
"default" under a note and mortgage prior to the entry of a foreclo-
sure judgment.
One commentator has argued that were the debtor not able to
cure because the note and mortgage merge into the judgment (there
being nothing left to cure), the debtor would be free to "modify" the
mortgagee's claim." According to this commentator, this would be
contrary to the Code's prohibition of plans that modify claims se-
cured by a "security interest in real property that is the debtor's
principal residence."95 Such a reading implies that although prior to
a foreclosure judgment a debtor could not modify a claim secured
only by his residence, the debtor could do so after entry of a foreclo-
sure judgment. Thus, he concludes, the creditor is made worse off by
having obtained a foreclosure judgment-an outcome that would
render section 1322(b) nonsensical."
This commentator bases his reasoning on a flawed reading of the
relevant case law, however. The commentator cites In re Roach for
the proposition that if a note and mortgage merge into a foreclosure
judgment, the mortgage lien ipso facto becomes a judicial lien.r
Roach, however, does not support that conclusion. The Roach court
merely held that under New Jersey law the mortgage merged into
the foreclosure judgment. The commentator apparently presumed
that if the mortgage no longer existed, the mortgage lien must like-
wise no longer exist. Furthermore, he presumed that some type of
lien must still exist, but that since the mortgage had merged with
the judgment, it could not be a mortgage lien. According to this rea-
soning, the lien must therefore be a judicial lien.
The definition of a "judicial lien," however, does not necessarily
encompass whatever lien in fact remains on the property. Even if
93. See, e.g., In re Read, 131 B.R 188 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1991) In Read the mort-
gagee had obtained a foreclosure judgment and had conducted a foreclosure sale prior
to the filing of the Chapter 13 petition by the debtor. In Alabama the foreclosure sale
commences the running of the redemption period. Id. at 188.89. The court noted that
"[u]nder Alabama law, the only interest remaining in the mortgagor after a foreclo-
sure sale is the right to redeem the property pursuant to the Alabama redemption
statute." Id. at 189 (citation omitted). In addition, the court noted that an Alabama
mortgagor could lose the statutory redemption right if he failed to relinquish the
property within ten days of a written demand by the purchaser. Id. The purchaser
had made such a written demand, and thus the court held that the "debtor has for-
feited his last remaining right in the property-the statutory right to redeem." Id.
(emphasis added). Most important, the court concluded that therefore the "property
is not property of the debtor or of the estate." Id.
94. See Winthrop, supra note 60, at 942-43.
95. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988).
96. Winthrop, supra note 60 at 943.
97. Id. at 942-43.
1992]
MAINE LAW REVIEW
one no longer identifies the lien as a mortgage lien, it nonetheless
remains a lien that was created by consent, until it is discharged.
For this reason any lien remaining after judgment would still fit the
definition of "security interest" under the Code and modifications
would therefore be prohibited.9 8
The key to this analysis lies in recognizing and separating the
components of a normal mortgage relationship-the note, the mort-
gage securing the note, and the lien, the recording of which estab-
lishes the lien's priority. The merger of the first two components
into a judgment does not necessarily require that the third be auto-
matically extinguished. Something further must be done to extin-
guish the lien.
More important, the commentator's point is essentially irrelevant
for purposes of analyzing the issue of whether a debtor could modify
the mortgagee's claim. Even if a plan could "modify" the rights of
the creditor/mortgagee in some fashion, a debtor could not cure and
de-accelerate and effectively reinstate the note and mortgage. At
that point the debtor would be trying to "modify" a claim based
upon a judgment, and not upon a note and mortgage. A mortgagee
holding a judgment and lien (even if it is a judicial lien) must be
paid the lesser of the value of the property or the amount of the
allowed claim within the time period of the plan. s9 Thus, the argu-
ment that the Code is rendered nonsensical by such an interpreta-
tion is unpersuasive.
Moreover, the underlying premise of the commentator's analysis is
flawed. He presumed that since a mortgagee holding a judgment
(rather than a note) no longer has a security interest, the prohibition
in section 1322(b)(2) against modification of a residential mortgage
was inapplicable; this, in turn, would enable a debtor to do what he
could not have done had no judgment been rendered, namely, mod-
98. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 101 (1979 & Supp. 1991); Johnson v. First Nat'l Bank of
Montevideo, 719 F.2d 270, 276 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1012 (1984)
("[I]t is only the right of redemption, rather than the property itself, which passes
into the bankruptcy estate if the redemption period has not expired at the time of
the bankruptcy petition. . . ."). See also First Fin. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Winkler,
29 B.R. 771, 775 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983). The Winkler court stated that "even after
the judgment [the mortgagee's] claim continued to be secured only by what
originated as its agreed-upon security interest in [the debtor's] principal residence.
Although now 'merged' into the judgment decree, [the mortgagee's] interest remained
a 'security interest' within the meaning of Code § 101(37) ... " Id. at 776. Moreover,
the Winkler court noted that the debtor's argument that a foreclosure judgment cre-
ated a judicial lien was "ingenious," and that "[tihat ingenious argument has found
one receptive judicial ear." Id. at 775 (citing In re Garner, 13 B.R. 799, 801 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1981)). The court then further noted that the debtor's "contention is not
only ingenious but metaphysical. [The debtor] argues [that the mortgagee] wound up
with less when it obtained more. ... Id. Thus, the court stated that "[s]tripped of
its speciousness, [the debtor's] argument is simply implausible." Id.
99. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (1988).
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ify the terms of the note. The flaw in such an analysis is glaring. If
the premise in the first instance is that no note or mortgage exists
(these having been merged into the judgment), a debtor, even with-
out the prohibition of section 1322(b), could not modify the terms of
the note, for the note no longer exists. The only "modification" pur-
suant to section 1322(b) would have to be in relation to the judg-
ment. The mortgagee with a judgment is entitled to payment to the
full extent of its secured claim within the plan period-and not over
time according to the terms of the original note.
Some courts and commentators have argued that making a debtor
comply with state redemption laws and prohibiting him from using
the cure provision in the Code allows state law to interfere with fed-
eral law. They note that, as a general rule, when state law interferes
with federal law, state law is preempted. By extension, federal cure
law, which allows a debtor to cure and reinstate a note and mort-
gage, should prevail. 10 0 The fundamental flaw in this line of reason-
ing is that it equates state statutory redemption laws with the con-
cept of "cure." The common definition of "cure," even according to
proponents of unfettered cure rights, relates to payment of amounts
past due and reinstatement of the terms of the obligation.' 0 ' Re-
demption, however, does not result in the "cure" of a default but
rather prevents the property from being sold-or it rescues it from
sale by paying in full the accelerated amount due as established by
the foreclosure judgment. To hold that section 1322(b)(5) allows a
cure and reinstatement of the terms of the note and mortgage at
this point, or to hold that section 1322(b)(2) allows a debtor in effect
to redeem over the life of a Chapter 13 plan rather than during the
time provided by Maine law, would defy the explicit mandate of
Butner.
Thus, in Maine if a foreclosure judgment has been entered, only
in the unlikely event that the debtor could obtain financing to re-
deem the property during the state statutory redemption period
could he hope to retain it.' 0 2 Otherwise, upon expiration of the re-
demption period, all of the debtor/mortgagor's rights in the property
are extinguished.
100. See, e.g., Sable, supra note 59, at 140; Miller, supra note 57, at 136; In re
Taddeo, 685 F.2d 24, 29 (2d Cir. 1982).
101. See, e.g., In re Taddeo, 685 F.2d at 26 ("Curing a default commonly means
taking care of the triggering event and returning to pre-default conditions.").
102. A recent Alabama bankruptcy court reached the same conclusion. See In re
Read, 131 B.P 188, 189 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1991). The Read court noted, however,
that "[s]ome courts appear to disregard state law and allow the curing of a pre-fore-
closure default through deferred payments even though the state redemption statute
requires lump sum payment of the entire mortgage debt." Id. at 189 n.5 (emphasis
added) (citation omitted). With regard to requiring a lump sum payment, the court
stated that "[rledemption by lump sum payment is not novel to the Bankruptcy
Code." Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 722).
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This position resolves the legal tension between Maine property
law and the Code. The practical tensions, of course, remain. As in a
Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the debtor may be interested in selling the
property himself rather than allowing the mortgagee to sell at a
foreclosure sale. If the sale of the property can create a surplus, exe-
cution of the Chapter 13 plan would be made easier. Moreover, the
Chapter 13 trustee would welcome any such surplus proceeds for the
purpose of satisfying other creditors. Thus, even though a Chapter
13 debtor presumably could not cure and de-accelerate a note, the
same practical tension may nonetheless arise between the Code and
Maine law that is present in the Chapter 7 example.
C. Chapter 11 Reorganization
For purposes of this Article, the analysis and conclusions dis-
cussed above concerning Chapter 13 cases apply to Chapter 11 cases
as well. A notable difference, however, is that while the Chapter 11
debtor and the Chapter 13 debtor enjoy the same privilege of curing
defaults, the Chapter 11 debtor is not limited in his ability to mod-
ify the terms of a note and mortgage, even a mortgage secured only
by a debtor's residence.10 3 Thus, a Chapter 11 debtor apparently is
free, in effect, to both cure and reinstate a note and mortgage and
simultaneously change the terms of the note and mortgage to some-
thing more favorable. 10 ' In addition, the Chapter 11 debtor can
often reduce the "principal" of its obligation so that it equals the
fair market value of the property, while the amount owed on the
original obligation in excess of the value of the mortgaged property
is categorized as a general unsecured claim. 0 5
103. See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5) (1988). This Code section provides that "a plan
shall ... provide adequate means for the plan's implementation, such as . . [the]
satisfaction or modification of any lien ... [and the] curing or waving of any default
.... " Id. § 1123(a)(5)(E)&(G) (emphasis added).
104. See id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(I)-(II) (1988). This section is the "cramdown" pro-
vision that allows for confirmation of a plan despite creditor objection as long as the
plan is fair and equitable and does not discriminate unfairly against any particular
creditor. In addition, secured creditors must be allowed to retain their liens and must
receive present value payments equal to at least their allowed claim. Id.
105. Chapter 11 plans can provide for the impairment of creditors' claims. This
essentially means that creditors' rights are altered in some fashion by the plan. See
11 U.S.C. § 1124 (1988). In addition, the Code defines an allowed claim as one se-
cured up to the value of the lien securing the claim and unsecured to the extent of
any excess. Id. § 506. Thus, a Chapter 11 debtor potentially can bifurcate a mortga-
gee's claim into a secured claim (which establishes the amount of the new obligation
on the property) and an unsecured claim. A mortgagee, of course, may reject such a
plan, in which case the debtor must demonstrate that the plan nonetheless treats the
mortgagee fairly. See id. § 1129(a)(8), (b)(1) (1988). Finally, a mortgagee may decide
to avoid such treatment by electing to have its entire claim treated as secured and




V. RELIEF FROM THE AUTOMATIC STAY
The preceding sections of this Article outline Maine mortgage law
and suggest how the court ought to mesh it with the Code. If this
argument is valid, a mortgagee will still want to know if and to what
extent it was subject to the automatic stay and under what circum-
stances it would need to seek relief from stay.
Under the mandate of the United States Supreme Court, a Maine
bankruptcy debtor, following a foreclosure judgment, retains only a
statutory right of redemption. Logically, therefore, only the redemp-
tion right should become property of the estate, not the physical
property itself."0 6 Prior to the expiration of the redemption period,
the trustee or debtor is free to exercise the debtor's right to redeem
the property by paying the entire amount owed to the mortgagee.
Upon the expiration of the redemption period, however, the debtor's
rights in the property are forever extinguished, 07 whereupon the
property is no longer property of the estate. Therefore, neither the
debtor nor the trustee has any rights to redeem the property or to
sell it himself. Although both the debtor and the trustee may believe
that the likelihood of a surplus is greater if one of them sells the
property rather than the mortgagee, neither would have a right to
conduct such a sale under Maine law. Thus, according to the ration-
ale of Butner, neither should have such a right in the context of a
bankruptcy.
After the expiration of the statutory redemption period, the
debtor's rights are limited by statute to the right to surplus pro-
ceeds, if any, which right is property of the estate. Thus, the estate's
check on any foreclosure sale must be derived from the Maine fore-
closure statutes, which grant a mortgagor the right to contest a fore-
closure sale based on a defect in the sale procedure or to challenge
the accounting from the sale.108
Assuming, therefore, that upon the expiration of the redemption
period the Chapter 7 trustee has no rights to dispose of the prop-
erty, and that the Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 debtors and trustees
have no right to de-accelerate and cure a note, attention necessarily
focuses on a mortgagee's right to conduct a foreclosure sale during
106. See Johnson v. First Nat'l Bank of Montevideo, 719 F.2d 270, 276 (8th Cir.
1983) ("[I]t is only the right of redemption, rather than the property itself, which
passes into the bankruptcy estate if the redemption period has not expired at the
time of [sic) the bankruptcy petition is filed.").
107. See St. Hilaire v. Berta, 588 A.2d 309, 310 (Me. 1991).
108. See Martel v. Bearce, 311 A.2d 540, 543 (Me. 1973) (holding that after the
expiration of the redemption period, the mortgagor can challenge the foreclosure by
attempting "to demonstrate in a legal action a failure in the procedure by which his
title was lost"); Ma. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6324 (West Supp. 1991-1992) (requiring
that the mortgagee file a report of the sale and providing the mortgagor a right to
contest the accounting); Id. § 6204-B (providing rights to an accounting under certain
circumstances in cases of strict foreclosure).
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the pendency of a bankruptcy case. Specifically, the issue is whether
a mortgagee is required to obtain relief from the automatic stay and,
if so, to what extent. Further, if a mortgagee is required to obtain
relief, the issue becomes: Upon what standard should the bank-
ruptcy court base its decision to grant relief?
A. The Necessity for Relief from Stay
If the period of redemption has not expired, the mortgagee may
want to obtain possession of the property. Alternatively, the mortga-
gee may be content simply to wait for the redemption period to ex-
pire, at which time the mortgagee will likely want to publish the
first notice of sale. Depending upon the time of year and the loca-
tion of the property, however, the mortgagee may prefer to wait un-
til further into the ninety-day period following the expiration of the
redemption period before publishing the first notice. Such a delay
may allow the mortgagee to market the property at a better time of
year with the hope of garnering a more favorable sales price. Alter-
natively, the mortgagee may wish to conduct the foreclosure sale im-
mediately and establish the deficiency. Even if the mortgagee
purchases at the sale, it can sell the property later when the market
may be better; it can then retain any "surplus" generated 09
If the mortgagee wishes to obtain possession of the premises to
ready them for sale, or to collect rents, or for whatever other reason,
it must first confirm or establish the right to such possession. Prior
to the expiration of the redemption period, the mortgage document
will determine who has rights to possession. If the mortgage is silent
as to the mortgagee's right to possession, presumably the mortgagee
has the right to possession upon default by the mortgagor.'1 0 Once
the redemption period has expired, however, the Maine statute ex-
pressly states that "any remaining rights of the mortgagor to posses-
sion shall terminate.""'
Prior to the expiration of the redemption period, the automatic
stay may apply to bar the mortgagee's attempts to obtain posses-
sion. The stay prohibits "the commencement or continuation. . . of
a judicial . . . proceeding against the debtor that was or could have
been commenced before the commencement of the case under this
title.""' 2 Unless the premises have been abandoned, the mortgagee
would have to institute a forcible entry and detainer action in order
109. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6323 (West Supp. 1990-1991).
110. See, e.g., First Auburn Trust Co. v. Buck, 137 Me. 172, 16 A2d 268 (1940);
Fogg v. Twin Town Chevrolet, 135 Me. 260, 194 A. 609 (1937). Cf. Gilpatrick v.
Chamberlain, 121 Me. 561, 118 A. 481 (1922); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 502 (West
1988).
111. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6323 (West Supp. 1990-1991).
112. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (1988).
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to establish its right to possession. 3 Relief from the stay would be
necessary prior to filing such an action.
If the mortgagee is content to wait until the expiration of the re-
demption period or has no rights to possession until the redemption
period expires, the stay will still bar actions to obtain possession at
that later point. In some cases the judgment of foreclosure will pro-
vide that a writ of possession shall issue upon the expiration of the
redemption period if the property is not redeemed.'1 ' Enforcement
of such a writ would most likely be construed to fall within the am-
bit of section 362(a)(2)'s prohibition of enforcing judgments."'
If the mortgagee is not concerned with obtaining possession prior
to its foreclosure sale or has already obtained possession by a volun-
tary surrender, must the mortgagee nonetheless obtain relief from
the stay in order either to publish the requisite notices or to conduct
the actual sale? The answer should be an unequivocal "no." Under
section 362(c) the automatic stay applies to acts against property of
the estate "until such property is no longer property of the es-
tate."11 As this Article has argued, the debtor's interest-and thus
the estate's interest-in the property is forever extinguished upon
the expiration of the redemption period." 7 Therefore, the property
is no longer property of the estate and acts against such property
are no longer stayed by section 362(a).
Thus, the mortgagee should be required to obtain relief from stay
only if the publication of the notice of sale or the sale itself were
otherwise prohibited by section 362(a). Analysis of each subsection
of section 362(a), however, clearly indicates that none of them apply
to either the publication of notice or to the sale itself.
1. Subsection 362(a)(1)
This subsection states that "the. . . continuation. . . of a judi-
cial. . . or other action or proceeding against a debtor that was...
commenced before the commencement of the [bankruptcy] case"I's
113. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6014(1) (West Supp. 1990-1991) ("Evic-
tions which are effected without resort to the provisions of [the forcible entry and
detainer statutes] are illegal and against public policy.").
114. See JA1tEs B. BARNS & F. BRUCE SLEEPER, MAINE MORTGAGE FoaCLosuRE:
START TO FINISH 1-14 (1990). The authors concede that issuance of a writ of posses.
sion in the context of a foreclosure action may not comport with the statute. Id.
115. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(2) (1988). A writ of possession is served by a sheriff on
the mortgagor, which allows the mortgagor to vacate the premises or else face physi-
cal ejection by the sheriff. See 1E. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6005 (West 1980). More-
over, the writ of possession is issued by virtue of a judgment, and its use would there-
fore likely be construed as enforcing that judgment. Section 362(a)(2) specifically
prohibits "the enforcement, against the debtor . . of a judgment obtained" prior to
the filing of the bankruptcy petition. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(2) (1988).
116. Id. § 362(c)(1) (1988).
117. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
118. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (1988).
1992]
MAINE LAW REVIEW
is stayed by filing of a bankruptcy petition. Arguably, the publica-
tion of a notice and subsequent sale are additional steps of a judicial
action against the debtor that was commenced prior to the filing of
the bankruptcy petition. Yet, the more sensible approach, which is
supported by a plain reading of the statute, is to regard the judicial
action against the debtor as having been completed upon the entry
of judgment of foreclosure. Certainly the notice and sale are neces-
sary steps in the statutory foreclosure procedure. But the type of
action contemplated by the stay provision effectively ended upon
the entry of judgment. Thus, the action from which the debtor
needed protection was already completed by the time of the filing of
the bankruptcy petition-specifically, at the entry of judgment of
foreclosure. For this reason, classifying the postjudgment publica-
tion of foreclosure sale as a judicial action, particularly in light of
the expiration of the redemption period and its effects, is simply
unwarranted.
In addition, the publication of the notice and sale involve the
property and not the debtor and thus do not fall within the express
language of the above subsection. The case of In re Gull Air, Inc.1"0
supports both of these propositions.
In Gull Air a debtor argued that the FAA's withdrawal and reallo-
cation of air slots violated the automatic stay. The Gull Air court
analyzed the stay's applicability under subsections 362(a)(1) and
(a) (3). The court reasoned that since the debtor's interest was com-
pletely extinguished automatically upon the expiration of a period
of nonuse, the air slots were no longer property of the estate and
thus section 362(a)(3) was inapplicable. 120 In addition, the court
held that once the debtor's rights in the property expired, action by
the FAA to reallocate the slots was not action against the debtor.
Thus, section 362(a)(1) was also inapplicable.' 2 1
Similarly, in Maine the running and expiration of the redemption
period is automatic after the judgment of foreclosure is entered. In
order to terminate the debtor's right to redeem, no affirmative ac-
tion is required by the creditor, the court or anyone else. The adver-
tisement and sale of the property is analogous to the FAA's termina-
tion letter and reallocation of the air slots in Gull Air. Moreover, a
mortgagee's actions are no more actions against the debtor than the
FAA's actions. Therefore, section 362(a)(1) is inapplicable in either
situation.
2. Subsection 362(a)(2)
This subsection states that "the enforcement, against the debtor
119. 890 F.2d 1255 (1st Cir. 1989).
120. Id. at 1261-62.
121. Id. at 1263.
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or against property of the estate, of a judgment obtained before the
commencement of the [bankruptcy] case"' 22 is also stayed. Again,
for reasons similar to those expressed above, classifying the notice of
sale and sale as "enforcement" of the judgment against the debtor is
unwarranted. The normal foreclosure judgment establishes that the
mortgagor breached the conditions of the note and mortgage and
that the mortgagee is entitled to payment or is free to conduct a
foreclosure sale pursuant to the terms of the statute. In addition,
the judgment ordinarily will include: (a) the issuance of a writ of
possession upon expiration of the redemption period 23 and (b) the
issuance of a writ of execution upon the establishment of the defi-
ciency following the sale."2
Enforcing either the writ of possession in order to remove the
debtor from the premises or the writ of execution in order to collect
the deficiency would be enforcing a judgment against the debtor and
therefore would be stayed by application of section 362(a)(2). Under
either writ the mortgagee would need to obtain relief from the stay
before proceeding.
In contrast, to the extent that it can be construed at all as "en-
forcement . . . of a judgment," the sale of the property is enforce-
ment of a judgment against the property and not against the debtor.
The sale, of course, is of property owned entirely by the mortgagee,
although the mortgagee is subject to the statutory obligation to sell,
and thus does not violate this subsection because the property does
not belong to the estate. 25
3. Subsection 362(a)(3)
This subsection states that "any act to obtain possession of prop-
erty of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise con-
trol over property of the estate" is likewise stayed.'2 0 Neither the
notice of sale nor the sale itself is an act to obtain possession of the
property. Thus, even if the estate could in some way be construed as
122. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(2) (1988).
123. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
124. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6324 (West Supp. i990-1991) (providing that
after a report of sale, "[amny deficiency shall be assessed against the mortgagor and an
execution shall be issued by the court therefor").
125. In a case applying Minnesota foreclosure law, the Eighth Circuit found that
upon expiration of the redemption period, Minnesota law provided that full title au-
tomatically vested in the purchaser at the foreclosure sale. Johnson v. First Nat'l
Bank of Montevideo, 719 F.2d 270, 278 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1012
(1984). Moreover, the only rights that the debtor had in bankruptcy were those de-
rived from state law, namely, the right to redeem within the applicable time period.
Id. at 276 & n.8 (citing Georgia Pacific Corp. v. Sigma Service Corp., 22 B.R. 984
(Bankr. M.D. La. 1982), reu'd on other ground, 712 F.2d 962 (5th Cir. 1983)). Like-
wise, under Maine law upon the expiration of the redemption period, the mortgagor's
title is completely divested. See Martel v. Bearce, 311 A.2d 540, 543 (Me. 1973).
126. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (1988).
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having possession of the property, these acts are not violative of sec-
tion 362(a)(3). Arguably, these acts could be viewed as exercising
control over the property, but since it is no longer property of the
estate, these acts still do not violate this subsection. 12 7
B. The Standard for Granting Relief
If a mortgagee seeks relief from the automatic stay, he must de-
termine which of two standards for granting this relief applies. The
two standards for granting relief from stay found in section 362 of
the Code are: (a) "for cause,' 12' and (b) where there is no equity in
the property and the property is not necessary for an effective reor-
ganization. 129 The only standard a bankruptcy judge should use is
the "for cause" standard. Only the "for cause" standard is applica-
ble because the standard in section 362(d)(2) concerning lack of eq-
uity in property applies "to a stay of an act against property" de-
scribed in section 362(a). s ° As noted above none of the subsections
found in section 362(a) applies. Thus, because the mortgagee would
not be seeking relief for any act against property to which the stay
applies, the section 362(d)(2) equity standard is inapplicable.
Even if the stay is construed to apply to the property, only sub-
section 362(a)(3) could conceivably apply. Each of the other subsec-
tions concern either the debtor or liens on the property. Moreover,
subsection 362(a)(2) applies to the debtor and to property of the
estate. Clearly, under Maine law the debtor, and hence the estate,
no longer has any interest in the property upon expiration of the
redemption period. Thus, the property would no longer be property
of the estate, making section 362(a)(2) inapplicable.
Section 362(a)(3), however, by its own terms could apply only if
127. The remaining subsections of section 362(a) are also inapplicable. Subsec-
tions 362(a)(4) and (5) refer to the enforcement of a lien against property of the
debtor. Id. §§ 362(a)(4)-(5) (1988). Specifically, subsection (a)(4) operates as a stay of
"any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate." Sub-
section (a)(5) operates as a stay of "any act to create, perfect, or enforce against prop.
erty of the debtor any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose
before the commencement of the case ... ." Once the redemption period expires,
however, the property is no longer property of the estate or of the debtor and there-
fore these subsections would not govern this situation.
The express language of subsections (6), (7), and (8) renders each of them inappli-
cable. Subsection (a)(6) operates as a stay of "any act to collect, assess, or recover a
claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case. . . ." Id. §
362(a)(6). Subsection (a)(7) operates as a stay of "the setoff of any debt owing to the
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case ... against any claim against
the debtor." Id. § 362(a)(7). Finally, subsection (a)(8) operates as a stay of "the com-
mencement ... of a proceeding before the United States Tax Court concerning the
debtor." Id. § 362(a)(8).
128. Id. § 362(d)(1) (1988).




the act were one "to obtain possession of ... property from the
estate ... ."'31 This would be a rare case at best, since usually the
debtor (and not the estate) is in possession of the property. None-
theless, the mortgagee should invoke the "for cause" provision of
section 362(d)(1) on the theory that even if the estate has possession
of the property, it is not entitled to retain it because the interest of
the debtor, and thus of the estate, is extinguished upon expiration of
the redemption period. For a court to deny the mortgagee relief for
insufficient cause and force it to prevail on the standard under sec-
tion 362(d)(2) would be to miss the point. The only interest the
debtor has is a statutory right to a surplus. Thus, the debtor has no
equity and, even more important, no interest at all in the property.
If section 362(d)(2) were applied, however, the debtor conceivably
could argue that, despite the lack of equity, the property is nonethe-
less necessary for an effective reorganization.1 3 2 Such an argument is
superficially appealing in that the debtor at one point had an inter-
est in the property that would have warranted retention of the prop-
erty. Upon the expiration of the redemption period, however, this
interest became nonexistent. Thus, the debtor would have as much
right to retain the property as he would to obtain an unrelated third
party's profitable enterprise just because those profits would be
helpful to the debtor's effective reorganization.
United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc.,133 decided by the United
States Supreme Court in 1983, supports this analysis. The Whiting
Pools case involved the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), which had
seized equipment of the debtor for unpaid taxes. Subsequent to the
seizure, the debtor filed a Chapter 11 petition. The IRS wanted to
proceed with a sale of the seized property and accordingly filed for
relief from the automatic stay. The debtor, as debtor-in-possession,
counterclaimed for an order requiring the IRS to turn over the
seized property pursuant to section 542(a) on the grounds that the
debtor intended to use the property in its reorganization. The IRS
contended that the debtor did not have a sufficient interest remain-
ing in the property after the seizure to require a turnover.""
Under the circumstances, the Court had to analyze the property
interests of the estate and determine whether these property inter-
ests were significant enough to allow the debtor to regain possession.
The Court concluded that the debtor's remaining interest in the
seized property was sufficient to allow the debtor to regain posses-
sion. The Court stated, however, that the "[1]egislative history indi-
cates that Congress intended to exclude from the estate property of
others in which the debtor had some minor interest such as a lien or
131. Id. § 362(a)(3) (1988).
132. See id. § 362(d)(2) (1988).




bare legal title."135 Furthermore, the Court stated, "Of course, if a
tax levy or seizure transfers to the IRS ownership of the property
seized, § 542(a) may not apply." 38 The Court noted, however, that
"[ojwnership of the [seized] property is transferred only when the
property is sold to a bona fide purchaser at a tax sale.'
3 7
In contrast, under Maine law full title to the mortgaged property
is completely transferred upon the expiration of the redemption pe-
riod. At that point the debtor has no interest in the property, much
less a "minor interest." 38 Thus, if the redemption period expires
and the mortgagee takes possession of the property prior to the
debtor's filing of a petition for bankruptcy, Whiting Pools indicates
that a trustee could not force a turnover, inasmuch as the trustee
could not "use, sell or lease" the property.13 It would be incongru-
ous that under Whiting Pools a trustee could not require a turnover
of the property on the grounds that the estate's "interest in the
property" is too minor, while in the context of section 362(d)(2) the
debtor could prevent the mortgagee from acquiring possession on
the basis of that very same "interest" of the estate.
VI. RECENT MAINE BANKRUPTCY CASES: THE TEMPTATION TO
IGNORE STATE LAW
Despite the analysis detailed in this Article, a bankruptcy trustee,
debtor, and judge often face certain temptations. As noted above the
bankruptcy participants may be convinced that a sale of the real
property within the bankruptcy case may produce a better price
than a sale conducted by the mortgagee. One temptation, therefore,
will be to deny the mortgagee relief from stay and allow the debtor
or trustee to sell the property.
Another prevalent temptation involves the situation where a
debtor files a Chapter 13 petition after a judgment of foreclosure is
entered but prior to the expiration of the redemption period, seek-
ing an order approving a plan to allow cure of all defaults and rein-
stating the terms of the note and mortgage. In such cases the temp-
tation will be to deny the mortgagee relief from stay and allow the
debtor to cure defaults and reinstate the note and mortgage terms
despite the impending expiration of the redemption pe-
riod-effectively voiding the foreclosure judgment. As this Article
contends, however, the mortgagee needs relief from stay only to the
extent that it wants possession of the property in order to conduct a
foreclosure sale. Alternatively, even if a bankruptcy judge were to
135. Id. at 204 n.8 (emphasis added).
136. Id. at 209 (emphasis added).
137. Id. at 211.
138. See supra text accompanying note 28.
139. Section 542 allows turnover where the trustee can use, sell, or lease property
as defined in § 363. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 363, 542 (1988).
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read section 362 unduly broadly and hold that the automatic stay
applies even after the expiration of the redemption period, the court
should grant relief under the "for cause" standard as a matter of
course because the debtor's interest in the property will cease to ex-
ist prior to the actual cure.
These temptations have proved too alluring for the bankruptcy
courts sitting in Maine to resist. In re F. Oliver Brittain"4 and In re
Tucker"' are prime examples.
The possibility of a surplus proved too great a temptation in F.
Oliver Brittain, an unpublished opinion by the bankruptcy court de-
void of any supporting authority. The F. Oliver Brittain case in-
volved a motion for relief from stay filed by a mortgagee of the
Chapter 13 debtor; the facts were undisputed. On May 31, 1989, the
mortgagee obtained a foreclosure judgment against the debtor's real
property. Absent a bankruptcy filing, the period of redemption
would have expired on August 28, 1989. The debtor, however, filed a
petition for relief on June 29, 1989. By application of section 108,
the period of redemption was extended one day to August 29, 1989.
When the mortgagee later filed for relief from stay, the redemption
period had expired and the "parties agree[d] that [the] debtor [did]
not have an equity of redemption but that [the] debtor [was] enti-
tled to any surplus produced at a foreclosure sale over and above the
amount the movant [was] due on the debt."'"2
The court correctly cited In re Thorn for the proposition that the
automatic stay did not suspend the running of the redemption pe-
riod.143 The court noted that "the Thorn case . . . did not address
what set of circumstances would give rise to granting or denying a
motion for relief from stay."'' 4 Curiously, the court then baldly
stated that the "issue of what property rights exist, if any, after the
equity of redemption has expired must be addressed under the cir-
cumstances of each case.'""4 From that position the court had no
choice but to complete its reasoning in a somewhat circular fashion.
The court concluded that despite the expiration of the redemp-
tion period, a mortgagee must bring a motion for relief from the
automatic stay in order to conduct a foreclosure sale and thus must
meet the standards found in section 362(d). In support of its conclu-
sion, the court again stated in summary fashion that the "Thorn
case neither modified the need to bring a motion for relief from stay
140. No. 89-10262 (Bankr. D. Me. Dec. 29, 1989).
141. 131 B.R. 245 (Bankr. D. Me. 1991).
142. In re F. Oliver Brittain, No. 89-10262, slip op. at 1.
143. 95 B.R. 261, 262 (Bankr. D. Me. 1989) (holding that strict time periods
within which a municipality must act in order to preserve its real property tax lien
continue to run despite the filing of the bankruptcy petition).
144. In re F. Oliver Brittain, No. 89-10262, slip op. at 2.
145. Id. (emphasis added).
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nor the conditions imposed before the Court could grant such relief
under 11 U.S.C. §362(d) and (g)."'4 The crucial question, however,
was clearly left begging-i.e., whether the stay was applicable in the
first instance. The court failed to support its conclusion with other
authority, and it did not acknowledge, as Butner requires, that
Maine law should be the basis for ascertaining what property inter-
ests remain upon expiration of the redemption period. Instead, the
court merely stated that it found "that the possibility of a surplus is
for purposes of 362(d)(2)(A) [tantamount to] an equity in prop-
erty. 14, The inference is that the possibility of a surplus, being an
equity, is an "interest" in the property, which interest "must be ad-
dressed under the circumstances of each case. '"4 8 Under this reason-
ing, only if no possibility of a surplus exists in a particular case
would it be possible to argue that no property rights exist in the
debtor or in the estate.
Although the problems with the court's analysis are manifest, one
is particularly troublesome. If the court defines "the possibility of a
surplus" as an interest in the property, a mortgagee will likely auto-
matically lose its motion for relief from stay if such a possibility ex-
ists (on the grounds that the debtor would then have an "equity" in
the property). If, however, no such possibility exists, the mortgagee
should logically prevail since the debtor would have no interest in
the property. The Brittain court, however, also failed to address the
implications of its rationale. Presumably, the debtor could still ar-
gue that, despite the lack of equity, the property is necessary for an
effective reorganization. Because subsection 362(d)(2) requires that
both standards be met before the mortgagee can obtain relief from
stay (i.e., no equity and not necessary for an effective reorganiza-
tion), the mortgagee could be denied relief from the automatic stay
if the debtor is successful in arguing that the property is necessary
for an effective reorganization despite the lack of equity.
In sum, the Brittain court failed to address the crucial first issue
(which is a necessary premise to the remainder of its reasoning):
whether and to what extent the debtor retained any rights in the
property sufficient to justify its retaining possession. The court
should then have analyzed whether and to what extent the auto-
matic stay applied to the mortgagee's actions regarding a foreclosure
sale. Only then could the court have properly addressed which stan-
dard to apply in granting relief. Significantly, the Brittain court
cited both standards for granting relief pursuant to section 362(d),
but then proceeded to ignore the "for cause" standard and analyzed
the mortgagee's request for relief under the equity standard, con-
cluding that the mortgagee had failed to carry its burden.
146. Id. slip op. at 3.




The other paradigmatic temptation confronting a bankruptcy
court is to allow the Chapter 13 debtor, despite the expiration of the
redemption period, to cure and reinstate the original terms of the
note and mortgage. This is exemplified in the recent case of In re
Tucker.249 In Tucker the mortgagee obtained a foreclosure judg-
ment, and just prior to the expiration of the redemption period, the
debtors filed for Chapter 13 protection. Subsequently, by applica-
tion of section 108(b), the redemption period was extended.'8 0 The
mortgagee argued that the debtors had no right to cure, while the
debtors argued that the rehabilitative provisions of Chapter 13 al-
lowed such a cure.18 1
The Tucker court agreed with a Sixth Circuit case that held that
a debtor has the right to cure at any time prior to a foreclosure
sale. 52 In the course of its opinion, the court made the following
149. 131 B.R. 245 (Bankr. D. Me. 1991).
150. Id. at 245. The Tucker court stated that the "issue presented is whether the
Debtors have a right to cure a mortgage default and reinstate current payments after
a foreclosure judgment has been entered, but before the period of redemption has
expired." Id. This statement is misleading in that it implies that the cure of the de-
fault will actually occur before the expiration of the redemption period. The court,
however, does not require that the default be cured prior to the expiration of the
redemption period but merely that the petition be filed prior to such expiration. Id.
at 245-46. Specifically, the court held that if a debtor files a petition before the expi-
ration of the redemption period, the court has jurisdiction over the property and that
§ 1322 allows the debtor to cure through the plan. The court stated that "a Chapter
13 plan may cure a mortgage default and reinstate the current payments, provided
the cure is reasonable." Id. at 246 (emphases added) (apparently alluding to
§ 1322(b)(5), which "provide[s] for the curing of any default within a reasonable
time.").
Moreover, the court stated that "[t]his is so notwithstanding the fact that a foreclo-
sure judgment has been entered prior to the debtor's filing a petition, so long as a
final order terminating the equity of redemption has not yet been entered." Id. (em-
phasis added). This statement is confusing, as the court apparently believed that a
foreclosure judgment is entered and then a "final order" is entered at the expiration
of the redemption period, which order terminates the redemption period. Maine's
foreclosure statute, however, merely provides for the commencement of the redemp-
tion period upon the entry of the foreclosure judgment. See M. REv STAT. ANN. tit.
14, § 6321 (West Supp. 1990-1991). Once that period has expired, the mortgagor's
rights are extinguished and the mortgagee has the right to sell the property. No fur-
ther order is required. See id. § 6322 (West Supp. 1990-1991).
In effect, therefore, the Tucker court appears to be holding that although the re-
demption period expires after the filing of the petition (which expiration presumably
terminates the debtor's rights in the property), a Chapter 13 plan can nonetheless
provide for the cure of defaults and effectively reinstate those rights by sheer force of
the court's order confirming the plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 1327 (1988) (stating the effect
of a plan's confirmation).
151. Id. at 245-46.
152. Id. at 246. The court approvingly cited In re Glenn, 760 F.2d 1428 (6th Cir.
1985). No court, however, should countenance the Glenn decision, given its
usurpatory nature. Finding that Congress was not as clear as the court wished, the
Glenn court essentially abrogated its obligation to analyze the law as it existed, bla-
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curious statement: "While state law is certainly relevant, it simply
dictates what property rights and interests a debtor holds. ' ' 15 3 Thus,
the Tucker court implicitly adopted the erroneous notion that
equates state redemption rights with the concept of cure. Specifi-
cally, the court analyzed state law and concluded that the debtors
retained redemption rights but then held that those rights were ir-
relevant for purposes of determining cure rights. Furthermore, the
court stated that federal bankruptcy law controlled the debtor's
right to cure, and not state law (i.e., not the right of redemption). In
effect despite the court's prior holdings to the contrary," 4 the
Tucker decision tolls the running of the redemption period upon the
filing of a bankruptcy petition. Thus, the Tucker decision allows a
mortgagor to retain an interest in the property despite the expira-
tion of the redemption period and thereby effectively allows a
debtor to void state court judgments.
tantly ignoring an explicit holding of the United States Supreme Court. The court
stated that "[w]e wish Congress had spoken its specific intent more clearly with re-
spect to cases involving acceleration, judgments, or sales. It did not but instead saw
fit to speak only in broad terms." Id. at 1435. Moreover, the court stated that "[w]e
despair of finding any clear-cut statutory language or legislative history that points
unerringly to a construction of the statute that is free from challenge." Id. Thus, the
Glenn court, in "despair" over not finding an easy answer, chose to ignore Butner and
instead fashioned an approach to be applied uniformly throughout the circuit regard-
less of any particular state's law. Specifically, the court rationalized:
The result we reach here is, therefore, primarily a pragmatic one-one
that we believe not only works the least violence to the competing concerns
evident in the language of the statute but also one that is most readily ca-
pable of use. The event we choose as the cut-off date of the statutory right
to cure defaults is the sale of the mortgaged premises.
Id. (emphases added). The Glenn court at least recognized that its decision could be
called into question, observing that its opinion "admittedly may form a large target
for criticism . Id.
The court went on to list seven reasons for choosing the foreclosure sale as the
point at which a Chapter 13 debtor loses his right to cure, the first of which baldly
stated that the "language of the statute is, to us, plainly a compromise . . . .Picking
a date between the two extremes, is likewise a compromise of sorts." Id. (emphasis
added).
Recall, however, that the Butner court explicitly rejected such a uniform approach
to property rights. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55-56 (1979). Specifically,
the Butner court stated that "[p]roperty rights are created and defined by state law."
Id. at 55 (emphasis added). Furthermore, the Court stated that "[ulniform treatment
of property interests by both state and federal courts within a State serves to reduce
uncertainty, to discourage forum shopping, and to prevent a party from receiving 'a
windfall merely by reason of the happenstance of bankruptcy.' "Id. (emphasis added)
(citation omitted). In stark contrast, the Glenn court unashamedly stated that "[in
so ruling we avoid any effort to analyze the transaction in terms of state property
law." In re Glenn, 760 F.2d at 1436 (emphasis added).
153. In re Tucker, 131 B.R. 245, 246 (Bankr. D. Me. 1991).
154. See, e.g., In re Thom, Inc., 95 B.R. 261 (Bankr. D. Me. 1989).
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VII. CONCLUSION
In order to mesh state foreclosure law with the Code's cure and
automatic stay provisions, bankruptcy courts should begin by ana-
lyzing the debtor's property rights under state law. This approach is
mandated by Butner. Under Maine law once the statutory redemp-
tion period has expired, the debtor is left with no interest in the
property. At this point the note and mortgage have merged into the
foreclosure judgment. Bankruptcy courts should not allow the
Code's cure and automatic stay provisions to give the debtor a
greater interest in the property than he has under Maine
law-which is nothing.
This analysis should allow the mortgagee to sell the property after
the expiration of the redemption period despite the automatic stay.
Furthermore, the debtor should be prevented from "curing" the
note and mortgage by reinstating their original terms.
Following this approach would allow the bankruptcy courts in
Maine to smoothly reconcile state and federal law in this area while
carrying out the Supreme Court's mandate.

